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ABSTRACT 
We describe a federated identity management service that allows 
users to access organisational resources using their existing login 
accounts at social networking and other sites, without 
compromising the security of the organisation’s resources. We 
utilise and extend the Level of Assurance (LoA) concept to ensure 
the organisation’s site remains secure. Users are empowered to 
link together their various accounts, including their organizational 
one with an external one, so that the strongest registration 
procedure of one linked account can be leveraged by the other 
sites’ login processes that have less stringent registration 
procedures. Coupled with attribute release from their 
organizational account, this allows users to escalate their 
privileges due to either an increased LoA, or additional attributes, 
or both. The conceptual and architectural designs are described, 
followed by the implementation details, the user trials we carried 
out, and a discussion of the current limitations of the system. 
Categories and Subject Descriptors 




federated identity management, level of assurance, social 
networks, authentication, authorisation. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Many organisations would like to develop stronger bonds with 
their customers and stakeholders, and give them personalised 
access to their web services. Universities are not an exception to 
this. Lifelong learning, student retention and alumni relations are 
all drivers towards strengthening the bonds between universities, 
their staff, and current, past and future students. The Logins4Life 
project was devised as an enabler of this, by allowing current and 
future staff and students to have account login access to university 
resources from the time of their first interaction with the 
university, until potentially the grave. However, the university did 
not want to unnecessarily proliferate the number of usernames and 
passwords that users need to remember. Instead it wanted to let 
users utilise their existing login accounts at social networking 
(SN) and other sites such as Google, to leverage their single sign 
on (SSO) capabilities when accessing university resources. A 
prospective student should be able to access low value resources 
at the university web site using their existing SN account, and, 
after registering as a student, be able to access more valuable 
resources, still using their SN account, but now benefitting from 
an increased assurance in his/her identity. 
One major problem in using these SN and other sites for SSO, is 
that they perform little or no authentication of their users’ 
identities at registration time. Thus there is no or very little 
binding between the virtual identity and the physical identity of a 
user. In terms of the NIST level of assurance (LoA) metric [8] this 
constitutes the lowest level. In comparison, the University of 
Kent’s registration procedure is at a much higher level comprising 
face to face registration with a passport, which provides a very 
strong binding between the virtual and physical identities of a 
user. Any resource that should only be available to registered staff 
or students of the university cannot be made available to users 
who simply authenticate via a SN site, as they literally could be 
anyone. This is unfortunate, since the majority of Kent’s students 
login to Facebook every day1 but they cannot use its SSO facility 
to access campus resources. Instead they have to login again using 
their more strongly assured university provided username and 
password. 
Another major problem is that some of these sites have very weak 
password policies, so it is relatively easy to masquerade as the 
site’s user. Any system that leverages the SSO capabilities of 
these sites will need to be able to differentiate between sites that 
perform very weak login processes and those that do a much 
better job. 
Leveraging SN and other sites thus presents a number of 
challenges. Firstly, the university does not know which SN 
accounts an existing or prospective student already has. Managing 
this would be costly to the university administration. User self-
account management on the other hand would provide an 
acceptable low cost solution if it could be done securely. 
Secondly, the low assurance associated with these sites must be 
increased if their SSO mechanisms are to be adopted for access to 
valuable university resources, but not if the sites login process is 
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 In a student survey taken for this project, >80% of students used 
Facebook for more than 1 hour per day and >35% used it for >5 
hours per day. In comparison about 30% used Kent’s website > 
1 hour per day and a negligible percent >5 hours per day. 
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unacceptably weak. Finally any system that is adopted must be 
very easy to use otherwise users will soon get frustrated and lose 
interest. We might summarise these challenges as “How can we 
leverage the ubiquity of social networking and similar sites to 
utilise their SSO mechanisms to access university resources, 
without compromising the security of the university's site“. 
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 reviews 
related work. Section 3 describes the conceptual design of the 
system, and section 4 the architectural design. Section 5 describes 
the implementation. Section 6 presents the user trials. Section 7 
concludes with a discussion of the implementation, its limitations, 
future enhancements and plans. 
2. RELATED WORK 
Authentication is a key functionality of federated identity 
management (FIM) systems, and according to the NIST special 
publication “Electronic Authentication Guideline” [8] it has three 
components: the protocol that is used to communicate the 
authentication assertion between the identity provider (IdP) and 
service provider (SP), the authentication mechanism and tokens 
that are used to authenticate the user by the IdP (here after called 
the login process), and the authentication procedure that is used 
by the IdP during user enrolment and registration (hereafter called 
the registration procedure). The Level of Assurance (LoA) 
concept combines all three components together to create a metric 
in the range from 1 to 4. All four levels require the assertion 
issued by the IdP to be cryptographically protected when 
transferred to the SP, but the registration procedure and login 
process vary from level to level.  
LoA 1, defined as little or no confidence in the asserted identity’s 
validity, is the lowest/weakest level of assurance and does not 
require the user to have been physically identified during 
registration. Remote anonymous registration is allowed. The login 
process allows medium strong passwords to be used provided they 
are not passed in the clear. The probability of correctly guessing a 
password during its lifetime needs to be worse than 1 in 1024 (or 
10 bits of entropy), which can be achieved for example, by 
requiring users to choose 8 character passwords with a mixture of 
upper/lower case and special characters, allowing only 2 wrong 
password attempts per minute and requiring users to change their 
passwords every year.  LoA 1 effectively assets that it is the same 
online user each time, but the SP can have little or no confidence 
in who this user actually is. Note that any IdP whose login process 
does not meet NIST‘s minimum requirements would not even 
qualify for LoA 1, and consequently should be assigned an LoA 
of 0. This effectively means that the SP cannot even have 
confidence that it is the same user each time.  
LoA 2, defined as some confidence in the asserted user’s identity, 
requires a government issued photo ID containing the user’s 
address or nationality, but it allows remote registration with 
validation by a trusted registration authority. A pseudonym may 
be used for identifying the user instead of a meaningful name. The 
login process can still use passwords, but now the entropy must be 
greater than 14 bits (1 in 16,384), which can be obtained with a 
randomly generated 6 character password from a 94 character 
alphabet, or a user generated 16 character password, and the same 
false attempts profile as above.  
LoA 3, defined as high confidence in the user’s asserted identity, 
has the same registration requirements as LoA 2, but login must 
now be via proof of possession of a secret e.g. a digital signature 
or Kerberos exchange. A one-time password can be used 
providing there are more than 1 million values. Pseudonyms can 
no longer be used to identify the user.  
LoA 4, defined as very high confidence in the user’s asserted 
identity, is the highest level of assurance. It requires face to face 
registration with two official documents such as a passport and 
birth certificate. Online login must be carried out using strong 
cryptography where the user’s key is held in a tamperproof 
hardware device.  
A variety of open protocols are in use between the IdP and SP. 
The UK Access Management Federation (UK-AMF), which is 
based on the Shibboleth protocol and implementation [2], has 845 
member organisations [4] which include over 220 SPs.  The 
Shibboleth protocol is currently based on SAMLv2 [3] and uses 
digitally signed assertions.  Another major protocol is OpenID [5] 
which boasts that 50,000 web sites can be accessed using it [6]. It 
uses symmetrically encrypted signatures to validate its assertions. 
Not all major SNSs support open protocols however, with sites 
such as Facebook using their own proprietary protocols. However, 
Twitter uses Oauthv2 [7] and Facebook is currently migrating to 
Oauthv2. 
When multiple protocols are involved in FIM, a proxy IdP is a 
useful component to act as a protocol gateway. It appears to be a 
normal IdP to the SP, talking its protocol, whilst it is in fact a 
gateway to other (hidden) IdPs which may talk different protocols. 
Proxy IdPs have been implemented in several FIM projects, with 
myVOCS [1] being one of the earlier examples. The weakness of 
the myVOCS model is that the SP has to trust the assertions made 
by the proxy IdP when it has no control over it and does not know 
the true source of the assertions that it receives. To overcome this, 
the proxy IdP needs to be part of the same trust domain as the SP. 
Account linking, which we utilize in this paper, was introduced in 
our prior research on attribute aggregation [9]. We devised a 
trusted third party linking service that allows users to link their 
various SAMLv2 IdP accounts together. We further develop this 
service here, to be a multi-protocol proxy IdP gateway for an 
organisation. 
3. CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
3.1 LoA Model 
Assuming the assertion protocol is always secure, then the NIST 
LoA concept comprises of two sets of variables: the registration 
procedure and the login process. The LoA of an IdP is determined 
by the lowest of these. If an IdP has a strong face to face 
registration procedure but a weak login process, then its overall 
LoA will be equal to that of the login process. Most SNSs have a 
very weak registration procedure so their LoAs are constrained to 
being ≤ 1, even if their login process is higher. Conversely many 
organisations have strong registration procedures requiring at least 
a government issued photo ID plus face to face registration, which 
could qualify as NIST LoA 4, but their login protocol might be 
much weaker. Conversely, Verisign class 1 certificates qualify for 
a login LoA of 3 but a registration LoA of 1. Our assertion is: if 
the strong registration procedure of an organisation can be 
securely combined with the strong login process of another IdP, 
whose registration LoA might be low, then the LoA of the user’s 
SSO session between this IdP and the organisation’s SP can 
potentially be raised to that of the organisation’s registration 
procedure. We propose to achieve this as follows. 
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The first proposal is to give each IdP two LoA scores: a 
registration LoA and a login LoA. The registration LoA measures 
the strength of its strongest registration procedure, whilst the login 
LoA measures the strength of its strongest login process (noting 
that an IdP may have several different registration procedures and 
offer several different login methods). The IdP‘s LoA will then be 
the lowest of these two viz: 
LoAIdP = Min [RegLoAIdP|LoginLoAIdP] 
The LoA of an IdP represents the most trust that a relying party 
can place in an IdP to authenticate its users, based on their 
registration and login methods. The relying party must obtain this 
information by some out of band mechanism e.g. in federation 
meta-data. 
The second proposal is to introduce a session LoA. This is the 
LoA that the IdP assigns to a given user for any particular login 
session. The session LoA will always be lower or equal to the 
IdP’s LoA. Factors that will make a session LoA lower than the 
IdP’s LoA could be: the user chose to use a weaker authentication 
mechanism for this session (LoginLoAUserIdP) or the LoA used a 
weaker procedure when registering this particular user 
(RegLoAUserIdP), viz: 
SessionLoAUserIdP = Min [RegLoAUserIdP| LoginLoAUserIdP] 
The relying party should be sent the registration LoA and login 
LoA as part of the authentication assertion, so that it can ensure 
that neither exceed the trusted maximum values, and it can then 
compute the session LoA itself. 
The third proposal is to allow users to login to different IdPs 
within a single session, to prove that they are the owner of a set of 
IdP accounts. This account linking procedure must be managed by 
a trusted service provider (TSP) which remembers the set of 
accounts that the user has linked together, and the session LoAs 
associated with each one. From these session LoAs it dynamically 
computes a registration LoA for the user with itself (RegLoAuser) 
based on the highest of the individual session LoAs, viz: 
RegLoAuser = Max [SessionLoAUerIdP1 ..SessionLoAUerIdPn ] 
The reason that the session LoA is used to compute the 
registration LoA (and not the individual RegLoAUserIdPi) is that a 
strong registration procedure is weakened by a weak login process 
so that a remote user can only be assured to the combined value of 
the two. The TSP stores the user’s registration LoA with itself. 
Note that the user is free to break any account linkage at any time 
by asking the TSP to delete a particular account from his linked 
set, in which case the user’s registration LoA will be recomputed 
from the remaining accounts. A user is also free to re-authenticate 
with the same or a different IdP using an alternative authentication 
method, in order to try to increase his session LoA with that IdP, 
and thereby increase his registration LoA with the TSP. 
The fourth proposal is that when a user logs in to an SP, the SP 
routes this request via the TSP, which acts as a proxy IdP for the 
SP. The LoA for the user’s session with the SP is dynamically 
computed by the TSP from the stored registration LoA of the user 
and the login LoA of the user with his chosen IdP, viz: 
LoAsession = Min [RegLoAuser|LoginLoAUserIdP] 
In this way we can leverage the strongest linked registration 
procedure undertaken by the user, with the current SSO login 
process to potentially compute a higher session LoA thereby 
giving the user increased privileges with the SP. 
3.2 Trust Model 
The TSP has to be trusted by the SPs and users that use it.  For 
this reason the TSP should be part of the SPs’ domain and 
managed by it. Users who contact this organisational domain for 
various services will be given the option of linking their various 
external IdP accounts together via the organisation’s TSP. Each 
time a user tries to access a service within the organisation, she 
will be routed via the TSP when the SP asks her to authenticate 
via her preferred IdP. The various IdPs are required to trust the 
TSP as a service of the organisation, and do not need to know that 
the TSP is a proxy for other services of the organisation. 
3.3 Attribute Model 
A user may have different attributes asserted by different IdPs. A 
user may also have attributes stored in the organisation’s 
corporate server (we currently assume this is an LDAP server but 
it need not be). The SPs will always trust the attributes provided 
by their own corporate server to be asserted at any LoA. However, 
the SPs will only trust the attributes provided by a remote IdP if 
they are asserted with a session LoA greater or equal to a 
requested threshold. When a user has linked his corporate account 
to one or more remote IdP accounts, and the user logs in via one 
of these remote accounts, then the TSP will always add the user’s 
local LDAP attributes to its response to the SP (to match the SP’s 
requirements). However the TSP will only keep any remotely 
asserted attributes if the IdP’s session LoA is equal to the user’s 
computed session LoA, i.e. 
SessionLoAUserIdP = LoAsession 
otherwise they will be discarded from the TSP’s response to the 
SP. This is because the user’s session LoA may be increased by 
the TSP, and we do not wish the user to be able to assert remotely 
assigned attributes at a higher LoA than they deserve (even if the 
assurance of the user’s authentication is increased).  
4. ARCHITECTURAL DESIGN 
The TSP comprises a user account database (the Account DB), an 
Account Management SP and a proxyIdP. The user account 
linkages and computed registration LoAs are stored in the 
Account DB which is managed by the Account Management SP. 
The LoAs (registration and login) of the known and contactable 
IdPs, are read in at start up from either the Federation Metadata or 
a configuration file.  
The Account Management SP is responsible for calculating the 
user registration LoA (RegLoAuser) dynamically as the user links 
(and unlinks) his various accounts together. When a user wishes 
to add an IdP account to his linked set, via the Account 
Management SP, he is first redirected to the proxyIdP, which 
allows him to choose between the contactable IdPs. Once the user 
has been authenticated by an IdP, the returned details of the IdP 
are stored in the Account DB by the proxyIdP and the user‘s 
registration LoA is then computed from the current set of linked 
accounts by the Account Management SP. 
The primary tasks of the proxyIdP are to:  
- act as an IdP discovery and filtering service by prompting the 
user to select his preferred IdP from the set that matches the 
SP’s requirements, in terms of both a required LoA and set of 
attributes,  
- compute the session LoA (LoAsession) in its response to the SP 
(excluding the account management SP) based on the stored 
registration LoA and the current login LoA,  
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- be a protocol gateway to communicate with the various IdPs, 
and 
- determine which user attributes are placed in the response to 
the SP.  
The SPs communicate with the proxyIdP using a standard 
protocol (we use SAMLv2), and the proxyIdP communicates with 
the various IdPs using their supported protocols e.g. SAMLv2, 
LDAP, OpenID, Oauth, Facebook etc. New protocols can be 
added to the proxyIdP as they become available. LDAP is used to 
communicate with the local organisation’s LDAP service for users 
who have local accounts with the organization. The LDAP service 
is assumed to hold the users’ login credentials and local attributes. 
LDAP can therefore act as the local IdP.  
The user chooses which IdP he wants to use for login and the 
proxyIDP then communicates with it using the appropriate 
protocol. It maps the response into a SAMLv2 assertion which it 
sends to the requesting SP. 
The overall architecture is shown in Figure 1.  
 
Figure 1. Overall Architecture 
A user may access the organisation’s public services (represented 
by Public SP in Figure 1) without any restrictions. However, 
whenever the user attempts to access any protected service in the 
organisation (SP1….SPn in Fig. 1), the user is redirected to the 
proxy IdP and is invited to login. The SP indicates the minimum 
level of assurance (LoA) it requires from an authenticating IdP as 
well as its required attributes. This causes the proxyIdP to tailor 
the login screen to only include those IdPs which are able to equal 
or surpass the requested LoA (based in their configured trusted 
LoAIdP values) and published attributes (after discounting any 
attributes that can be obtained from the local LDAP) i.e. the 
proxyIdP knows the maximal values that these IdPs can issue, but 
does not know whether they will issue them for this particular 
user. This filtering is necessary but not sufficient i.e. there is no 
point in including IdPs in the list which the proxyIdP knows 
cannot fulfill the SP’s requirements, but until the user has been 
authenticated the proxyIdP cannot know for sure which IdPs are 
capable of fulfilling them. 
The account management SP is made available at the 
organisation’s web site in the same way as any other SP, so the 
user does not need to do anything special to invoke it in order to 
link together his IdP accounts. 
4.1 Account Linking 
Before a user is known to the TSP, she will not have any records 
in the Account DB, regardless of whether she exists in the 
organisation’s LDAP service or not. The first time a (unknown) 
user interacts with the TSP and chooses an IdP to authenticate to, 
the proxyIdP will receive a persistent identifier (PId) from the 
IdP. The PId might be a username (e.g. from Twitter), or a uni-
directional identifier (e.g. from a SAML IdP). The proxyIdP 
searches for the IdP/PId combination in the Account DB, and 
upon not finding it, creates a new entry for this user. The user may 
decide to always use this same account, say Facebook, for 
accessing the organisation’s SPs, in which case this is all that will 
ever be stored in the Account DB. 
If the user decides to use a different IdP account for accessing an 
SP, then a second, unrelated entry in the Account DB will be 
created for the same user. At this point in time the TSP does not 
know that these two accounts belong to the same user. 
Whenever a user chooses to authenticate via the organisation’s 
LDAP, this causes the proxyIdP to store, in addition to the 
IdP/PId, the user’s LDAP DN in the Account DB. Thereafter the 
proxyIdP is able to retrieve the user’s local attributes. 
The user can choose to link together her existing IdP accounts 
whenever she chooses via the Account Management SP. Access to 
the Account Management SP is in the same way as to all the other 
SPs and requires the user to login via the proxyIdP. Once 
authenticated, the user is shown her currently linked account 
details, which first time around will only be the current IdP 
account. The user may choose to link any of her other IdP 
accounts to this one by selecting the Add New Account option, in 
which case she is logged out of the current IdP by the Account 
Management SP and redirected to the proxyIdP which displays 
the IdP selection screen again. The user chooses a new IdP, is 
redirected to it, authenticates and is then redirected back to the 
proxyIdP. If the returned PId-IdP tuple is unknown to the 
proxyIdP, it inserts a new account entry in the Account DB. The 
user is then redirected back to the Account Management SP for 
account linking to take place and the Registration LoA to be 
recomputed. If the newly logged in account is not already linked 
with any other accounts then it is simply added to the current set 
of the user’s linked accounts, but if the account is already linked 
with other accounts the user is given a Warning message and 
asked if she wants to merge this account (and all of its existing 
linked accounts) with the current set of account(s), or move the 
account on its own to the current set, or cancel the operation 
without linking it to the current set. In this way the user is left 
completely in charge of managing her identity, and can have as 
many sets of linked and unlinked accounts as she wishes in the 
TSP. 
The Account Management SP allows the user to link/unlink 
different accounts with each other and thereby increase/decrease 
the registration LoA value associated with each set of linked 
accounts. 
4.2 Authorisation 
Authorisation comprises two parts: firstly the proxyIdP retrieves 
the attributes and LoA of the user, and secondly the SP makes an 
access decision based on these, typically by calling a backend 
authorisation server to obtain an access decision. The proxy IdP 
gets the user’s attributes from up to two sources: i) if the user has 
a linked local account, the LDAP server, and ii) from the 










































computed session LoA i.e. SessionLoAUserIdP = LoAsession. The 
latter stops an unsafe escalation of assurance of externally 
asserted attributes. For example, users who might have linked two 
external accounts together, one with a high LoA that asserts no 
attributes, and one with a low LoA that asserts many attributes, 
are not able to increase the LoA of the asserted attributes. They 
can either choose to authenticate with an unlinked IdP with a low 
LoA which asserts the attributes, or with a linked IdP to obtain a 
higher LoA but without the attributes. On the other hand, users 
who are registered with the organization and have attributes in the 
corporate LDAP (which are always trusted), but who might have 
authenticated via an external IdP such as Facebook, can gain 
additional authorisation privileges by linking their internal and 
external accounts together as described above. In this way the 
proxyIdP can still retrieve their attributes from the organisation’s 
LDAP server even when an external IdP was used. 
Once the proxyIdP has obtained the user’s initial set of credentials 
it can determine if they are sufficient to fulfill the SP’s 
requirements. If they are not, it returns the user to the IdP 
discovery screen with an improved filtered list of IdPs which has 
now been tailored to the specific user, and the user will have to 
authenticate again to a different IdP in order to fulfill the SP’s 
requirements. 
Each PDP in the authorisation server is configured with a hybrid 
RBAC-ABAC policy in which the LoA is modelled as a 
hierarchical role, in which level 4 > 3 > 2 > 1. In this way, any 
resource which requires an LoA of 1 to be accessed, will be 
accessible regardless of the actual LoA assigned to the user’s 
session. The PDP’s policy can be as fine grained as needed, and 
its decisions can be based on any of the user’s attributes stored in 
either the organisation’s LDAP server or an external IdP. 
5. IMPLEMENTATION 
5.1 Determining the LoAs 
In order to implement the design, we have to determine  
a) the LoA of each IdP (i.e. the components of LoAIdP) which 
represents the maximum trust we  can have in an IdP 
b) the LoA of each user session (i.e. the components of 
SessionLoAUserIdP) which should not exceed the maximum above 
For SAML based IdPs, the SAML community has recently 
published a committee draft [11] that defines an attribute 
(urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:attribute:assurance-certification) 
suitable for inclusion in SAML Metadata which provides the IdP's 
assurance certification i.e. LoAIdP. The Shibboleth implementation 
of SAMLv2 has recently introduced support for this. Whilst this is 
only intended to publish a single LoA value, the schema allows it 
to contain multiple values, so an IdP can use it to publish both its 
registration and login LoA values.  
SAML IdPs that do not yet support this standardised feature have 
often had other non-standardized mechanisms for indicating an 
IdP’s LoA. For example, the UK Access Management Federation 
(AMF) agreement [13] contains clause 6 which states that IdPs 
which can “match the use of services provided by Service 
Providers to individual End Users” can publish this declaration in 
their Metadata. This equates to them saying that they conform to a 
registration LoA of at least 2. So it is possible to determine 
whether a UK AMF IdP’s registration procedures are to LoA 2 or 
not by looking at the appropriate field in the federation metadata. 
However there is currently no way of knowing what their login 
LoA is.  
The fallback position is that the SP can ask each IdP that it trusts 
for its registration and login LoA values when setting up its 
contractual agreements with them. 
Dynamically determining the session LoA is more problematic. 
The OASIS draft [11] provides guidelines for the use of SAML's 
Authentication Context mechanism (which uses the 
<AuthnContextClassRef> element) to request and express an LoA 
in SAML assertions (i.e. SessionLoAUserIdP). Extending this to 
return both the registration and login LoAs is inconvenient as it 
means combining two values into one, but this is not impossible. 
It can be done by defining m*m LoA URIs rather than 2*m URIs, 
where m is the number of LoA values (4 in the NIST case). 
However, no existing UK AMF SAML IdPs currently return any 
LoA information dynamically, so in the current implementation 
we have had to assume that the dynamic values are the same as 
the statically configured maximum values.  
LoA information is neither published nor dynamically transferred 
for SN and other non-SAML IdPs, so we have had to determine 
these by experiment. In order to do this, we created 
pseudonymous accounts on Google, Facebook, Twitter and an 
OpenID provider in order to see what registration information was 
asked for, how it was validated, plus what the minimum 
requirements for password strength were and how easy it was to 
brute force crack them. We then computed the IdP’s LoAs from 
the experimentally determined registration and login LoAs. We 
further assumed that the dynamic session LoAs will always be the 
same as these experimentally determined and statically configured 
values.  
The experimental results are as follows. Google validates the 
email address of the user, so we had to register the email address 
csidiot@yahoo.com in order to open a Google account. No other 
details were validated. So this would only gain the lowest 
registration LoA of 1. The password field on the registration form 
specifies that the password must be eight or more characters in 
length. There are no other stated requirements although we were 
not allowed to use “password” or any dictionary word that we 
tried. A password strength meter records the strength and won’t 
allow weak passwords to be used. Using Table A.1 of [8] we 
compute this as 30 bits of entropy. Concerning wrong password 
attempts, after 6 wrong passwords, you are required to complete a 
Captcha puzzle on every subsequent attempt. The best we could 
attempt was 25 wrong passwords in 5 minutes by clearing cookies 
after each 6 wrong passwords. This equates to 2.7M attempts per 
year (approx. 21 bits of entropy). So Google just about qualifies 
for Login LoA 1, which requires 10 bits of entropy for the life of 
the password. 
Twitter allows the user to register any name (we used idiot) and 
does not check any of the details including the email address – we 
used idiot@spam.la and it still created the account. This only 
qualifies for the lowest registration LoA of 1. The only restriction 
imposed on the password was that it must be six or more 
characters in length and “passwd” was allowed. It appears that 
any dictionary word is allowed so this only scores 14 bits of 
entropy from NIST’s Table A.1. After 3 false password attempts 
you are required to complete a Captcha with every password 
attempt. However if you simply replace the URL 
https://www.twitter.com/#!/login/captcha/ with 
https://www.twitter.com/#!/login/ then no Captcha is asked for. 
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Consequently we were able to perform 100 login attempts in 29.9 
seconds with JMeter. At this rate 105M passwords could be tried 
in a year (approx. 30 bits of entropy) and it would take just over a 
day to crack a weak password. This does not remotely qualify for 
NIST login LoA 1 and must be given 0. 
Facebook has some restrictions on first and last names, since idiot 
was not allowed for either. However no registration details are 
validated as we used an email address of idiot@<a valid domain> 
and this was allowed even though it does not exist. Again this 
qualifies for the lowest registration LoA of 1. The password must 
be at least six characters in length, and like Google it does not 
specify any other requirements but it will not allow dictionary 
words. It did however allow “facepass”. We gave this 23 bits of 
entropy from Table A.1. After 3 wrong password attempts the 
user is given a Captcha. The user can either clear out cookies and 
try another 3 times, or complete the Captcha and then continue. 
After each 3 wrong attempts the user is sent via several redirects 
to “help” pages, which in fact slow down an attacker. After 33 
false passwords we were given an error message about too many 
failed attempts and then had to complete some more pages which 
takes another minute or so. The best we could achieve was 33 
wrong passwords per 6 minutes, which is 2.9M per year (approx. 
21.5 bits of entropy). So whilst it would take over a year to crack 
a weak password with Facebook, it does not quite qualify for a 
login LoA of 1 and unfortunately we have to give it a 0. 
Since there are many OpenID providers it is impossible to 
determine a generic registration process as it varies with the 
provider. We registered on myid.net with idiot.myid.net and the 
email address of idiot@spam.la. No validation was performed. 
This still qualifies for the lowest registration LoA of 1. The 
password must be six characters or more in length, but no other 
restrictions apply and we registered with “password”. We gave 
this an entropy of 14 bits. Multiple false passwords can be tried 
repeatedly with no restrictions. Using JMeter we tried 1500 
passwords in 2mins 30secs, which equates to 315M in a year 
(approx. 31.5 bits of entropy). This is clearly a login LoA of 0. In 
order to qualify for login LoA 1, this OpenID provider would 
need to request 25 character long passwords from its users. 
By way of comparison, the University of Kent performs face to 
face registration of both staff and students that requires the person 
to present their passport. In addition students have to provide their 
degree certificates, and staff their national insurance details. This 
qualifies for a registration LoA 4. It’s password policy states that 
passwords must be between 9 and 16 characters chosen from at 
least three of: upper case, lower case, numerals and special 
characters. This automatically rules out dictionary words and 
gives an entropy of 31 bits.  Passwords have to be changed at least 
every 9 months, and recently used passwords cannot be used 
again. After 3 wrong password attempts the user is redirected to 
another page before they can try again. We managed to enter 9 
wrong passwords in one minute. After 10 wrong passwords the 
user is locked out for one hour, so the most password attempts one 
can have in its lifetime is 65K, or 16 bits of entropy. This leaves 
15 bits of entropy which exceeds NIST’s requirements for login 
LoA 2. 
The experimentally determined values for the registration and 
login LoAs for the above IdPs is stored in a configuration file and 
read into the TSP at initialization time. We might add that the 
login LoAs we have assigned to the above SN IdPs are for the 
worst case scenarios and apply to users choosing the weakest 
passwords possible. If the IdPs change their login processes these 
values will need to be re-assessed. But in order to protect the 
organizational resources we have to take the most cautious 
approach. 
5.2 Proxy IdP 
The proxy IdP has been implemented using the open source 
SimpleSAMLphp [14].  This supports module-based design and 
has different modules for implementing different authentication 
mechanisms, e.g. OpenID, Facebook, Twitter, etc., with the ability 
to add new modules as desired.  The Twitter, OpenID, LDAPAuth 
and Google modules worked out of the box, but the 
AuthFacebook module had to be re-written as the provided one 
did not work correctly (it was based on an old Facebook API 
specification). 
We created two new modules for our proxyIdP. The first, loaauth, 
allows the set of IdPs to be filtered according to the LoA 
requested by the organisation’s SP in the 
<authnContextClassRef> inside the SAML authentication request. 
This ensures that the IdPs whose LoAs are known to be lower 
than that requested by the SP are filtered out so that only IdPs 
whose LoA are sufficient will be displayed to the user during the 
authentication phase. We are currently in the process of adding 
attribute filtering to this as well, so that IdPs that cannot provide 
the required attributes (over and above the ones provided by the 
organisation’s LDAP) are also filtered out.  
The second, loaldapcheck, computes the correct LoA and set of 
attributes to be inserted into the response to the SP. First it checks 
if the authenticated user has an entry in the Account Database, and 
if not creates one. Next it checks if the user has a linked account 
in the organisation’s LDAP. If so, it retrieves the user’s attributes 
according to its preconfigured Attribute Release Policy (ARP) and 
the SP’s request, and inserts these into the response to the SP. It 
then computes the user’s session LoA from the stored registration 
LoA and the current login LoA and adds this to the user’s set of 
attributes (the rationale for this is explained in the next section). 
Finally it removes any IdP asserted attributes if the computed 
session LoA is greater than the configured LoA of the IdP.  
The simpleSAMLphp code then creates a signed and encrypted 
SAMLv 2.0 <samlp:Response> message for the requesting SP, 
containing the computed LoA and retrieved attributes. 
5.3 Protocols 
We use the SAMLv2 protocol between the organisation’s SPs and 
the proxyIdP and between the proxyIdP and the SAML IdPs. The 
SP use the <AuthnContextClassRef> to request the LoA from the 
proxyIdP. The SP uses the open source simpleSAMLphp code to 
process the SAML requests/responses with the proxyIdP. 
Unfortunately this code does not provide a mechanism to extract 
the <AuthnContextClassRef> element from the response message, 
in order to retrieve the user’s session LoA. We had two 
implementation options in order to provide LoA based 
authorisation: 
i) we could change the simpleSAMLphp source code to 
extract the field. However this approach potentially produces a 
long term support overhead each time the next release of 
simpleSAMLphp is released (unless our code is adopted by the 
distributors). Furthermore the SP still has to pass the LoA to the 
authorisation server in some way. Consequently this way was 
deemed to be unsuitable;  
ii) we could modify the proxy IdP to add the session LoA 
value to the set of subject attributes in the attribute assertion of the 
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SAMLv2.0 response it creates. The SP will then transparently 
handle the LoA attribute along with all the other user attributes. 
This is the approach we adopted. 
The current SAMLv2.0 specification is deficient in that it is not 
possible to dynamically request a set of attributes at authentication 
time (although it is possible if two round trips are performed, the 
first to authenticate the user only, and the second to request the 
user’s attributes only). All the SP can currently do is set the 
<AttributeConsumingServiceIndex> attribute in the authentication 
request to a predefined integer value which the IdP is meant to 
map into an already known set of attributes published in the SP’s 
metadata. Consequently, we recommend that the SAMLv2.0 
specification be enhanced by defining a new request type: the 
<AuthnAttributeRequest> message, which allows the SP to 
dynamically request the set of attributes it requires along with its 
current authentication request. In the current implementation the 
proxyIdP (acting as the organisation’s SP) sets the 
<AttributeConsumingServiceIndex> attribute to the value 0, 
which means return ALL attributes, then the proxyIdP does the 
attribute filtering. 
For non-SAML IdPs, the proxyIdP utilises the appropriate 
protocol module to access the user’s chosen IdP. The latter 
performs user authentication and returns an authentication 
assertion to the module along with the user’s attributes (if any). 
The protocol module validates the received assertion, extracts the 
PId/IdP tuple and any attributes, appends the configured session 
LoA for this IdP as experimentally determined above, then returns 
these to the proxy IdP. The proxy IdP then creates the 
<samlp:Response> message for the SP. 
When the SP receives the <samlp:Response> message from the 
proxyIdP it validates the assertion. This involves decrypting the 
SSO assertion using its private key and verifying the signature 
with the public key of the proxy IdP to ensure message validity 
and confidentiality. Finally it checks that it is indeed the intended 
recipient of the assertion, using the <AudienceRestriction> 
element, and that the assertion is still valid timewise. If the 
response is valid, each user attribute contained in the assertion 
(including the session LoA) is parsed and mapped into its 
equivalent XACML counterpart and added to an XACML request 
context. The PDP policy can then treat the LoA attribute as just 
another user attribute when making an authorisation decision. 
The SP now talks to the backend authorisation server using the 
SAML-XACML protocol [12]. This request contains a standard 
XACML request-response context [10] wrapped as a new type of 
SAML assertion – the XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery assertion. 
The SAML-XACML protocol allows additional levels of security 
to be added to the request, such as authentication and encryption. 
In our implementation we use TLS. It also allows the SP to 
specify the authorisation policy to be used by the authorisation 
server to process the SP’s request. This allows us to support 
multiple PDPs and multiple policies in the authorisation server, 
and to have a different policy for each SP. The protocol allows 
either a Policy Reference or a full policy to be placed in the body 
of the XACMLAuthzDecisionQuery request, such policy to be 
used to authorise the user’s request. 
When the authorisation server receives the SAML-XACML 
request it determines which of its PDPs to use to evaluate the 
request. Once a PDP has been chosen this evaluates the XACML 
request and returns an XACML response.  If a DENY response is 
returned the user is redirected to an authorisation denied page that 
provides the user with links to logout her current SSO session and 
re-authenticate using a different account. If a GRANT response is 
returned the requested page is displayed. 
6. User Trials 
The user trials were designed to determine the ease of use of the 
system, and the level of understanding an external, novice user 
would achieve from using the system for the first time. Users were 
asked to perform the following three tasks, and to “think aloud” 
whilst doing so. This allowed the observer to tape record the 
user’s thought processes for later analysis so as to discover where 
any usability problems might lie. 
These first set of tests were performed with our initial prototype 
system that allowed the proxyIdP to filter suitable IdPs based on 
their LoAs, but not on their attributes. This feature is currently 
being implemented. 
6.1 User Tasks 
The users were asked to perform 3 different tasks. 
1. Download the University of Kent postgraduate 
application form. 
This task requires an LoA of 0 which can be achieved by logging 
in with any IdP account, navigating to the postgraduate studies 
section, and then selecting a hyper link to download the .doc form. 
The user can subsequently track their application through the 
system by logging in using the same (or another linked) IdP (not 
part of this task). 
2. Determine which lecture is in week 6 for module 
CO876. 
This task requires the user to have an LoA of at least 1 and an 
eduPersonAffiliation of “University of Kent”. The LoA is 
achievable by either logging in via the university LDAP, or via 
most UK-AMF IdPs or Google or Facebook (which we 
configured to have a login LoA of 1 for these tests). The 
eduPersonAffiliation can only be obtained by either logging in via 
the university LDAP, or one of the user’s other LoA 1 accounts 
which has previously been linked to the user’s LDAP account. 
3. Access the Student Data System (SDS) 
This task requires an LoA of 2 and additionally an 
eduPersonAffiliation of “University of Kent”. This combination is 
only achieved by logging in via the university LDAP or the 
University of Kent IdP in the UK-AMF. 
Each user was given specific instructions as to which accounts 
they should use in order to complete the tasks. All users who 
underwent the trials already had their own Facebook and 
university accounts (at least). 
1. User 1 was asked to use any of their existing accounts as they 
saw fit.  
2. User 2 was asked to use only their Facebook account. 
3. User 3 was asked to use only their university account. 
4. User 4 was given the un/pw for a UK-AMF account with an 
LoA of 2, and asked to use this account first and then any 
other account of their choosing. 
5. User 5 was the same as User 4, but after performing the 3 
tasks was specifically asked to link his accounts together and 
then repeat the 3 tasks again. 
6.2 User Trials Results 
The tests were designed so that all users, except User 2, would be 
able to complete all three tasks. User 2 would only be able to 
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complete Task 1. These results were indeed obtained, as expected. 
However, these results on their own tell us little about the ease of 
use of the system. For this, we need to analyse the tape recordings 
of the users “thinking aloud”. In most cases the users proceeded 
without difficulty and were able to complete the tasks in a very 
straightforward manner meaning that few comments were 
recorded. A breakdown of each user experience is given below. 
User 1 - used his2 university account to login for task 1 and as a 
result was authenticated to LoA 2 and had an affiliation of 
University of Kent, which were sufficient for all the following 
tasks. Due to this, all tasks were completed without any issues. 
After completing the tasks he voluntarily linked his Twitter, 
Google, and Facebook accounts to his Kent account, and he also 
logged out of the system.  He then logged back in with his 
Facebook account which he used to access Moodle. He noted that 
the tasks were easy to complete, and that the system was simple to 
understand but it would have been helpful to know which account 
he was currently logged into, and that perhaps the pages should 
display a message such as “Logged in via Facebook”. 
User 2 - was asked to login using his Facebook account and was 
therefore unable to complete any tasks other than task 1. Despite 
this the user noted that he understood why access was being 
denied as he had only used Facebook to log in. 
User 3 - was asked to use his university login account and because 
of this each task was carried out without issue. The user 
mentioned that everything was easy to find and access. 
User 4 - was given account details for a UK-AMF LoA 2 account 
and asked to use this initially, followed by any other accounts as 
he saw fit. For task 1 he logged in using the UK-AMF option and 
completed the task without issue. When he attempted task 2 he 
was told he was not authorised to access the Moodle service. He 
mentioned aloud at this point that he must need to login with his 
University of Kent account as the university's Moodle service is 
only for local students. He returned to the home page, logged out, 
reattempted to access Moodle, was prompted to login, chose his 
university account and was granted access to Moodle. All 
subsequent tasks were completed successfully.  He did not choose 
to access the Account Management service. 
User 5 - was given the same instructions as User 4 but after he had 
completed the 3 tasks he was asked to access the Account 
Management service and link some of his accounts together, then 
log out and repeat the tasks again. The results were interesting. 
Task 1 was completed as per User 4, but when User 5 attempted 
task 2 and was prompted to login again he chose the Facebook 
option, logged into his Facebook account and subsequently was 
told that the account did not have enough access rights. This 
pointed to our original “attribute based IdP filtering” design issue 
which is now being implemented. User 5 then chose his university 
account and successfully accessed Moodle and completed the 
remaining task. The user then accessed the Account Management 
section and linked his Facebook account to his university account 
(which he was already logged in with). He noted aloud that the 
name returned by Facebook was just a collection of random 
numbers, so he clicked on the name and saw he could rename it, 
so he renamed it to “Alex's Facebook”. He then linked his Twitter 
account, and mentioned that as the displayed name was the same 
                                                                
2
 The gender in the text does not necessarily reflect the gender of 
each participant 
as his username for Twitter it was fine so he didn't need to rename 
it. Finally he linked his Google account, the default name of 
which is also a long string of numbers. He noted this and renamed 
it to “My gmail”. After this he returned to the homepage and 
logged out, before attempting task 1 again. Task 1 was completed 
successfully using the UK-AMF account he had been given. 
When he attempted to complete task 2 he was again told he was 
not authorised to access the resource.  He returned to the home 
page, logged out, and then clicked the Moodle link again. He 
again tried to use his Facebook account to login (at this point he 
also noticed that he was already logged into Facebook as it 
supports SSO and so didn't have to re-enter his details) and this 
time he was granted access to Moodle. He said aloud that this was 
probably because he had linked it to his university account (which 
is correct). When he attempted to access SDS he was told he 
needed a higher level of authentication. At first he tried to use his 
new UK-AMF account but was told he didn't have access.  This is 
another symptom of the attribute based IdP filtering problem 
discussed above. He said aloud that this was because the SDS was 
only accessible to University of Kent students (which is correct) 
and so he logged out and then reattempted the task with his 
university account, which allowed him to successfully complete 
the task. It should be noted that if User 5 had linked his new UK-
AMF account to his university account then he would have been 
granted access to SDS, but one surmises that he did not regard this 
as being “his” account and therefore did not link it to his other 
ones.. 
In general there was not a great deal of “thinking aloud” during 
the tests as most of the tests were quite straightforward. Users 
mostly mentioned that they found the tasks easy to complete, and 
that the system was simple to understand. Two users (1 and 5) 
noted that it would have been helpful to know which account they 
were currently logged into, and that perhaps the pages should 
display a message such as “Logged in via Facebook”. This has 
now been added to the system. Another user mentioned that it 
helped them to know which account to use to login to more 
sensitive pages because only the applicable log in options were 
displayed. 
7. Discussion 
The project has achieved its initial objectives and allows external 
users to easily access university resources using their existing 
external login accounts, without having to first register at the 
university for a new account (which job and postgraduate 
applicants currently have to do).  Furthermore, existing students 
who have both university and external accounts such as Google 
(or Facebook for this test), can choose to link these together, and 
afterwards, will be able to seamlessly access restricted university 
resources, such as Moodle, using the SSO features of (Facebook 
and) Google. Since many students tend to login to Facebook as 
one of the first tasks they do every day (before attending lectures!) 
then they will no longer need to login to their university accounts 
in order to access lecture material on Moodle. 
Clearly one major issue is that Facebook’s login process is still 
not robust enough to qualify for LoA 1. (We set it to 1 for these 
tests to see how users would adapt to using it to access university 
resources.) Whilst most Facebook users may well choose medium 
or strong passwords which will pass the LoA 1 threshold, some 
will not. So for this reason Facebook accounts won’t be able to be 
used to access privileged university resources until their login 
process is strengthened. 
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Another major issue is that most IdPs do not currently reveal their 
overall LoA let alone the two major components that comprise it. 
Until IdPs are willing to be publish their LoAs and transfer them 
in protocol, the scheme proposed here will need significant effort 
by SPs to determine the LoAs of their “trusted” IdPs. 
One outstanding issue at the time the trials were run was that of 
IdP filtering based on the attributes they release (which User 5 
encountered). Since our original prototype we have improved the 
design (as described in this paper) so that the proxyIdP will 
request and store a list of attribute types that each IdP is prepared 
to release for each user. The will allow the proxyIDP to filter out 
inappropriate IdPs and allow the user to select between the 
remaining ones based on the attributes and LoAs the IdPs can 
provide. This is currently being implemented. 
One major issue that currently has not been addressed is how to 
retire dead accounts. We expect that the Account DB will grow to 
many hundreds of thousands of entries over time, and that some 
users will lose interest, forget all their passwords or even die, 
before removing their old accounts from the system. Thus the 
university has to devise a way of removing dead accounts without 
removing infrequently used though still active accounts.  
Annually emailing each user is one proposed solution, but we 
recognise that this does not fully address the issue. The topic of 
Digital Death [15] is starting to attract significant attention in the 
identity management world. 
There are many as yet unexplored opportunities for leveraging 
this system. Password management is one of them. This is 
currently a costly exercise for many organisations. When students 
forget their university passwords today, they have to go through a 
manual procedure which involves turning up with their ID card at 
a help desk, and being issued with a new password. If their 
university account is linked to an external account with as strong 
as or stronger login LoA, it should be possible, after logging in via 
the external account, to request that a new university password be 
emailed to them.  Providing the Login LoAs of the external 
account and the email system are as strong as the university’s 
login LoA, then the same level of assurance will have been 
obtained in order to allow a new password to be issued, as a 
change password request today. 
The developed software is being released as open source code 
through the university’s web site and Feide, the authors of 
simpleSAMLphp. A public demonstration (of the system used in 
the user trials) is also available [16]. 
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